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 1.  Introduction  
 The paper is divided into six sections including the present one. The following section
discusses broadly the data used for purposes of analysis, and the position of Malaysian
economy during the crisis. Section 3 deals with controls as a tool for managing financial
turmoil. Section 4 argues, on the basis of results, that for Malaysia the imposition of
controls was a better course of action than seeking help from the IMF. Section 5 makes
brief reference to some challenges including the issue of dollar-ringgit peg. Section 6
contains a few concluding remarks.   
 2.  Malaysia and the Crisis  
 Malaysian economy has largely been on a sound footing since independence. In
recent years it has enjoyed full employment, considerable stability in the price level, and
high growth, the average rate being 8.7 % during 1990-97.1 Malaysia, though small,
occupied in the world a high rank at 35 in 1997 with reference to the size of both the
aggregate and per capita GNP. Again, it essentially is a trading country. Exports and
imports play a major role in the progress of the economy: their sum was, for example,
1.85 times of her GDP in 1997.2 Thus, the economy is highly open, and is much
susceptible to external disturbances. More so because foreign capital continually
supplements domestic savings to sustain high investment rates for pushing up growth.3
Retaining the advantage is by no means easy, especially because international economic
policy is increasingly assuming political overtones. The high performance of the
Malaysian economy maintained over the decades, without markets or technology or even
the core capital being local, cannot be slighted. Policy and performance appraisals during
and after the melt down have not always been conscious of this fact. Furthermore, most
of the studies dealing with the crisis have relied for analyzing the situation on the yearly
or at best the quarterly data for the pertinent variables that was available from various
sources. Sometimes, it was perhaps the nature and periodicity of the data one could lay
hands on that dictated the model form, or the issues one selected for discussion.
However, the crisis essentially being a short-term phenomenon, even monthly data
concealed more than it could reveal. The periodicity of the data used could rarely capture
the abruptness of the event the authors sought to deal with. In the case of Malaysia, the
crisis could hardly be seen coming and pre-empted (Woo et al p.130). This paper,
therefore, takes a different course. It relies on weekly data pertaining to the variables it
uses: foreign exchange rates, interest rates, and stock market indices. The primary
source of these figures has been the business section of the New Strait Times and relate
to the closing quotations of each Tuesday 4. If the Tuesday quotation was not available
for any reason, the closing quotation available for the nearest day has been used. 
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 Figure 1 Showing fluctuations in the KLCI and the $-RM Rate
 
 In Malaysia the financial meltdown started towards the close of July 1997, the major
fall in the stock prices occurring sometime in the first week of the following month. The
stock market fell by 68.58 % and the dollar-ringgit rate plunged by over 37 % during the
worst patch of about a year 5. The following figure depicts the position during the first
sixty-three weeks of the crisis: the period from July 1, 1997 to September 8, 1998.
Clearly the fall in the stock prices was sharper and larger compared to the dollar value of
the ringgit. For, the
exchange rate essentially
was affected by the flight
of foreign funds while the
stock market had an
additional factor: the local
speculators unnerved by
the external unloading too
rushed for liquidating their
positions. Soon any drop
in either of the markets
seemed feeding the one
that followed. Figure 2
depicts the relationship
between the KLCI and the
dollar price of the ringgit.
The correlation was high,
the value of r equaled
0.875. But the result was
found vitiated by the
presence of serial
correlation; the Durbin-Watson statistic for the estimate at 0.359 was much smaller than
even the lower bound requirement of 1.562. To investigate if there were a genuine casual
relationship between the KLCI and the dollar-ringgit rate, we tried transformation of the
data to first differences.The regression based on differences has no intercept, and R
square measures the proportion   of variability in the dependent variable about the origin
explained by regression6. However, the above results do indicate that the fluctuations in
the KLCI had been closely related to the variations in the $-RM rate during the crisis. In
fact, there is evidence to show that the relationship was characterized by feed back
interactions in which the change in exchange rate could take the lead and vice versa
(Granger, Huang, and Yang p.346), the flight of foreign capital pulling down both the
markets. Though we could not get capital flows data for the relevant weeks, there is
some evidence supporting the contention: the short term capital account of the country
recorded a substantial net outflow of funds - RM 11.3b in 1997 and 21.7b in 1998 7.
Possibly, bulk of this amount moved out during the first sixty-three weeks of the crisis.
The trend continued in the following year the figure crossing the RM 36 b mark. It is well
to indicate that these figures include as well some flows not forming part of portfolio
investment8.
 Model 1
 D KLCI est.                    =  1576.588 D $-RM Rate R = 0.459  Rsq. = .211  Adj. Rsq. = .198  F = 16.26
 Standard  Error             =    390.930                          Standard Error of the estimate           = 49.381
 t - value                    =        4.033          Runs test,  Z = 2.09
 P- values (one tailed)            (.000 )              (.018)                 (.000)
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 Model 2: Correlation Coefficients (First
Differences)
  KLCI  $-RM
rate
 Nikkei
 KLCI  1.000  0.459 (.000)
 0.256
 (.022)
 $-RM
rate
  1.000  0.148 (.000)
 Nikkei    1.000
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
 
    
 
 The major policy instrument used during the
period was the interest rate structure represented
here by the Kuala Lumpur three monthly inter
bank offer rates i.e. KLibor. This rate was
continually pushed up during the period. Figure 3
above shows the position. However, higher
interest could not prove attractive enough to slow
down let alone reverse the outflow of funds. The correlation between the original values
of the two variables was negative (-0.553) and significant. When first differences were
used to remove serial correlation the coefficient though remained negative became
negligible {-0.053) and insignificant. Thus the monetary policy pursued during the period
was a total failure. Not only it failed to keep foreign money at home, it made business
borrowings costlier contributing to economic slowdown. Presumably even the investment
of local funds abroad tended to rise if retained earnings were taken into account. 
 N = 62
 Summary Results
 D KLCI est. = 0.432 D $-RM rate + 0.198 D Nikkei   R = 0.50   R2 = 0.25   R2 Adj.= 0.224  F = 9.94
 t - values       3.827                        1.753                Runs test statistic  Z = 2.661
 p-values      (.000)                        (.085)                   (.004)                     (.000)
 Note: P-values shown in parentheses are one tailed
 Japan and the USA have traditionally been among the leading trade partners of
Malaysia, accounting for about 35% of her annual imports and exports, and sharing it in
almost equal measure.9 However, as the ringgit was informally linked to the US currency
even prior to the turmoil, and the flight of funds was essentially in terms of dollars, one
expected the KLCI fluctuations linked in some way to variations in the US stocks prices
as measured by, say, Dow Jones index. But statistically one finds no significant
relationship between the two indices during the period. On the other hand, the KLCI and
the Japanese Nikkei are found interrelated. In fact the regression improves if we include
Nikkei as an explanatory variable in addition to the $-RM rate in the model. We again use
the first differences and the results are given in Model 2 above the regression coefficients
are in their standardized version. 
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 Figure 3 Showing fluctuations in the KLibor
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 The addition of any other explanatory variable like interest rates, Singapore stock
market index, Kuala Lumpur futures index, or the yen-dollar rate that we tried only
deteriorated the results, most of the regression coefficients turning insignificant. Thus,
one can safely conclude that the first sixty-three weeks of the crisis were almost
completely dominated by the flight of capital from Malaysia. 
 3. The Response 
 Though this paper is not concerned with the causes of the crisis 10, a few remarks may
help understand the Malaysian response to it. Many economists and international
financial institutions including the IMF broadly attributed the turmoil, to the weak macro
economic fundamentals of the affected economies, and the contagion crossing the
borders. Both reasons missed the point. How can economies blooming for decades,
doing rather ‘miracles’, become weak in fundamentals overnight? The argument could
hardly explain the suddenness or the magnitude of the disaster. And how is it that the
very same economies are now not only up on their feet again but also tending to pick up
pace? The fact is that it was not the weak fundamentals of these economies, which
invited the trouble; it was the trouble that threatened their fundamentals. There was need
to make a distinction between the real economy and the financial system of a country 11.
In the Malaysian case, even the financial system entered the financial crisis in 1997 from
a position of strength. It was the severity of the crisis that caused cracks in its structure 12. 
 The contagion did play a role, but not within the suffering economies. It was located
outside i.e. among the foreign portfolio investors. Once they were convinced that the
exchange rate was out of what they p rceived as the equilibrium, massive, one way
speculative action was expected (Kawai p.14). No less than 108 billion US dollars left the
region within the first six months of the crisis (Pang p.2). At home, the herd behavior of
the local speculators aggravated the situation in the stock market but had little to do with
the foreign currency trading. 
 Policy suggestions made to arrest the
turmoil had to be in line with its causes as
seen by the ‘international community’, and
its financial arm the IMF. It was suggested
that the countries in trouble must
undertake economic and financial reforms,
impart more transparency to government
policies, make macro economic
adjustments, and initiate measures to
vitalize their economic and financial
systems. Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea
took steps to remedy their economic
weaknesses, and tried to soften the
speculative pressure on their currencies.
But they soon found the crisis beyond their
control. They decided, as per their circumstances, to seek financial assistance from the
IMF. Following the package of conditions the IMF invariably attached to such help, these
countries had to implement tight monetary and fiscal policies, and had to undertake
prescribed structural reforms particularly in the financial sector. Meanwhile the slide
continued in Malaysia perhaps because the country wanted to try the usual means to
stem the rot before it took the final decision. Many projects on the anvil were dropped,
those in progress were slowed down, public expenditure was curtailed, some allowances
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to employees were abolished or reduced, and many foreign workers had to leave. But the
economizing efforts, or the high interest regime we alluded to earlier all proved of no
avail. In a nutshell, the real GDP registered a fall of about 6% during the span of about a
year. The decision on policy response could no longer be postponed. There of course
was no bar on going to the IMF for assistance. However, such assistance never came
without prior agreement of the seeker to abide by the conditions the IMF chose to
impose. Experience of developing countries regarding the condition was not in general
encouraging in economic terms. More than that these conditions abridged the recipients’
freedom of action. Many considered the acceptance of the IMF program as the surrender
of a country’s sovereignty and discretion to the international community.
 The alternative Malaysia chose was the imposition of capital controls. Of course there
was nothing novel about the choice per se. The monetary history is full with instances of
all sorts of countries-developed and developing-using controls to regulate foreign capital
flows. Indeed in a seminar held in June 1998 at the International Islamic University of
Malaysia (IIUM) on the turmoil, the author had himself proposed the steps 13 which, he
then had no idea, would constitute the core of the package the government put in place
later in September 1998. However, the decision was novel for the courage of conviction it
needed in an atmosphere loaded with the new urges for liberalization and openness. It
was a decision to swim against the currents, and was in that sense quite risky. The theory
underlying controls on foreign capital flows is simple. We may use the following demand
and supply diagram to explain it. In the figure 4 below, DD shows the demand for dollars
at its various ringgit prices for importing goods and services from abroad, remittances by
aliens, and outflows of capital. Likewise, the SS curve expresses the supply of dollars in
the Malaysian foreign exchange market, and include  receipts from the export of goods
and services, money send home by the nationals living abroad, and capital inflows from
foreign countries. The equilibrium exchange rate R0 is determined by the interaction of
these forces. The large scale speculative outflows of capital push the demand curve
upward to D’D’ putting pressure on the local currency leading to its depreciation. Two
options are available to remedy the situation. As the demand for foreign currency
increases, the central bank may increase its supply in the market appropriately beyond T
along the flattened S’ curve for maintaining the exchange rate at a desired level such as
R1. Usually developed economies with vast foreign exchange reserves use this option.
The international community has no objection to the remedy. For, such intervention in no
way reduces the volume of transactions in the market. In fact at the beginning of the crisis
Malaysia, despite her reserves being small, did spend a few billion dollars in the region
q0q1 to arrest the fall of the ringgit, but soon found the task beyond her capacity.
 On September 2, 1998 Bank Negara Malaysia pegged the ringgit to the US dollar at
3.80:1 - about 10% higher the level the rate had already fallen. It also announced controls
on foreign capital flows to restrict the speculative demand for the ringgit DD from shifting
upward and prevent the internationalization of the currency. To the free traders the
restrictions are distasteful as they reduce the market volume of transactions. However,
Malaysian controls were s lective designed, as they were to help achieve the objectives
of the country’s plan for economic recovery. They left direct foreign investment
untouched, while keeping current account transactions fully convertible 14   Th  main
elements of the package as per Bank Negara Report 1998 (p. 62) were: 1) Selected
ringgit-denominated transactions among non-residents effected via their external
accounts required approval. 2) Short-term capital flows were to remain in the country for a
minimum period of one year, though they could be actively managed in the form of ringgit
assets. 3) Import and export of ringgit by travelers, both residents and non-residents,
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 Figure 5 showing net short-term capital flows
were restricted for amounts exceeding RM 1000. 4) Malaysian investments abroad
exceeding the equivalent of RM 10000 required prior approval; and 5) Malaysians
traveling abroad required approval to carry foreign currencies in excess of RM 10000
equivalent. 
To supplement the controls for ushering in economic recovery the tight money policy
which invariably is an important ingredient of the IMF recipe and which the country
religiously followed for about a year of deepening recession was replaced with the
Keynesian prescription. The cheap money policy took place of the rising interest rates
regime. Thus, the 3-month KLibor steadily fell from around 10% in August 1998 to 3.25%
in more recent weeks 15. Several measures were taken to increase effective demand: for
example, banking institutions with the capacity to lend were encouraged to achieve a
minimum loan growth target of 8% in due course of time, conditions for lending to
construction companies were eased, ceiling on loans for purchasing shares and units
were relaxed, margin of financing for all passenger cars was raised, and minimum
monthly repayment on credit cards was reduced 16. Capital controls are already in a
process of withdrawal:  he lock-in ended in September 1999. Thus, avoiding the IMF
assistance, tight money policy, restructuring program, austerity measures, and conditions,
Malaysia chartered her own course to put the economy back on track, and succeeded.
The following section takes a hurried look at her achievements.
4.  The Results 
The GDP suffered a steep fall of 7.5% in 1998. Still, the economy could register a
growth rate of over 6% and cross the 1997 per capita income mark in the following year.
The output of manufacturing industries expanded by 13.5% while unemployment declined
to less than 3%. From a fall of 8.7% in 1998 investment rose by over 10% in 1999.
Controls had an immediate effect on outflow of reserves as Table 1 shows.17
Table1: Outflow of Reserves 1998 (US $ million)
Months September October November December
Outflow 526.9 269.3 112.7 368.2 
Direct foreign
investment in the country
was not much influenced
by the turmoil. From a
little less than RM 20
billion in 1997 it did dip to
around half of that
amount in 1998 but the
trend picked up later. FDI
rose to RM 13.3 billion in
the following year. The
rise is not insignificant in
view of the fact that in
1999 the overall share of
the Southeast Asian
countries in direct foreign
investment declined by
17%. 18 On the other
hand, controls proved
quite effective in curbing
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 Figure 6 showing KLCI and NPI Relationship (March 5, 1999-August 16, 2000)
 
KLCI Klibor Yen-$
Rate
Nikkei
KLCI .000 -0.260
(.000)
0.194
(.024)
0.229
(.009)
Klibor 1.000 0.018
(.428)
-0.113
(.127)
Yen-$
Rate
1.000 .024
(.404)
Nikkei 1.000
 
the short-term capital flows. We have net portfolio cumulative inflow figures in million
ringgits for seventy weeks i.e. from March 5, 1999 to August 16, 2000. The first
differences of the series give us the weekly data on net portfolio inflows (NPI). Figure 5
shows the position.        
The close correlation between the KLCI and short-term capital flows has been broken:
the coefficient is small (-0.045), and statistically insignificant. The mean for the seventy
weeks is a mere two million of ringgits. Figure 6 below shows the relationship. It is
interesting to see that after the imposition of controls some notable changes have taken
place in the determinants of the KLCI. The $-RM rate, being fixed, no longer remained
relevant, and the short-term capital flows too seem to have spent their force. Over the
last 107 weeks spanning from September 15, 1998 to October 11, 2000 interest rates
have maintained their inverse relationship with the
KLCI, Yen-$ rate has assumed importance, the impact of Nikkei continues, and the
influence of Dow Jones remains insignificant. Again based on first differences the
regression results are
shown in Model 3 below.
The coefficients of
regression in the model
are standardized.
Interestingly, unlike Model
2, it satisfies the Durbin -
Watson test but defies the
runs test. 19                                           
Not only capital controls,
the pump priming action
also helped. Effective
demand revived:
consumption expenditure,
public and private, went up
in real terms by 10.68% in
1999 over that of the
previous year, and was
not much lower than that
of 1997. The income of the
government also rose: In
addition to the restoration
of various cuts effected during the down turn in remuneration of employees, a 10% raise
to them could also be granted. Despite the increases in expenditure, the budget for 2000
shows a surplus for the first time after remaining in deficit for three consecutive years. 
Model Summary
D KLCI est. = - 0.241D KLibor + 0.193D Yen-$ Rate + 0.197
D Nikkei    R = 0.361    F = 5.777  
t - values           -2.616               2.108             2.144
p-values         (.010)               (.037)                         (.035)
(.000)
Note: p -values is one tailed
The countries that sought the IMF
assistance have also come out of recession.
But one must desist from making comparisons. The circumstances, social environment
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mental attitudes, institutional set up, power structures, pressure groups, and international
relations of various countries are so different from one another that comparing them for
the causes of the crisis or for their responses to it may not be very rewarding. In addition,
the differences in the quality of data, in the definitions used in their compilation, in the
time span they covered, and in their periodicity sometimes pose insurmountable
difficulties and may render comparisons meaningless. However, one observation may be
made without being much off the mark: Malaysia came out of the crisis less scarred and
faster than Thailand and Indonesia, the two Asean neighbors who went to the IMF for
assistance. 
The distinctive feature of the Malaysian response to the crisis has been that the
country tried to make people realize at home and abroad the potential of unregulated
currency trading to inflict severe hurt to the developing economies. It pleaded against its
acceptability as an inseparable ingredient of the globalization process. That it could win
friends and influence people on that score is perhaps a much greater achievement of
Malaysia than the economic gains she reaped from her policy choice. Today the country
has greater respect for her economic management than ever before. This has won for
her in recent weeks higher currency ratings, and upward revision of her growth rate
estimates for the current year. 20 
5.  Lessons and Challenges 
 
     The Malaysian experience has some valuable lessons to offer, and poses not a few
challenges. It revealed many organizational weaknesses, especially in the financial
sector, which are currently being taken care of. Special attention is being paid to the
enlargement of the size of banks through mergers. What could be the optimal size for a
bank, or would the enlargement of size necessarily ensure efficiency are the sort of
questions that need careful investigation. In addition, the dilution of the banks’ general
financing character by establishing or strengthening special purpose institutions in the
private sector to finance construction, small industries, agriculture, more effective
investment, refinancing and the like is perhaps worth considering. This may improve the
overall efficiency of the financial system and reduce risks through specialization. Zainal-
Abidin makes a number of useful suggestions concerning, for example, liquidity
management, a clear-cut separation of the FDI from short-term capital flows, and self-
confidence for achieving national aspirations (pp.145-146) 
An important challenge for tomorrow concerns the ringgit- dollar peg. Should the peg
continue, and if yes are its level and form in need of a review are already tending to
become serious issues It looks prudent to maintain the peg unless some mechanism at
the international level is evolved and put in place to ensure that currency traders will no
longer be free to upset fairly stable economies through their reckless speculative actions.
The introduction of a contingency credit line CCL by the IMF in April 1999, and the recent
proposal to strengthen it further are the first straws in the air. More may follow in course
of time. However, the level and form of the peg are more difficult issues. 
In principle, a little overvaluation of the currency may help growth in a developing
economy. Here, exports and imports are not often price elastic and the exchange gap is
a planned one: currency depreciation cannot be expected to benefit much. An over-
valued currency does not hurt so much on the export front as it benefits in terms of both
imports, and the servicing of foreign capital becoming cheaper. The informal tie of the
ringgit to the US dollar before the crisis benefited Malaysia considerably: the tie made the
local money rise in value against most of the currencies, yen in particular, as the US
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Figure 7 showing the fall of Yen-$ rate since Sept. 1, 1998
dollar was on an ascending run in the foreign exchange markets of the world for more
than half of the current decade. 
The advantage was more than neutralized by the steep fall of the ringgit during the
period from July 1997 to August 1998. The fixation of the rate at RM 3.80 to a US dollar
compared to RM2.52, from where it started falling, was the formal recognition of about
34% devaluation of the currency. The fixation made exports of the country cheaper by
the same percentage while imports became costlier by about 51% The impact of
devaluation on the exports and imports of the country is shown in the following table
taking their provisional values from Bank Negara Report 1999 (Table A.6) at current
prices with 1998 as the base. 
Table 2: Impact of Devaluation on Exports and Imports in 1999 with 1998 = 100
Year Exports
(RM
million)
P01 Q01 V01 ED Imports
(RM
million)
P01 Q01 V01 ED
1998 286563 100 100 100 1 228125 100 100 100 1
1999 321181 66 170 112 >1 248847 151 73 110 <1
Thus the value index of exports rose only 12% with a fall of 34% in their prices due to
devaluation. The country had to export 70% more in physical terms to obtain the
indicated increase in the money value, for V01 = P01. Q01. Such a rise in quantity is quite
improbable: one has to wait for the release of actual export figures for 1999. Till then it is
safer to take their price elasticity as less, not more, than unity. On the other hand, the
money value of imports, though they became costlier by 51%, did not fall. It went up by
10% because in physical terms imports could be reduced by only 27%. Their price
elasticity obviously is less than one. 
 The country has been
disadvantaged not only
because her exports and
imports are not much price
elastic but also for an
additional reason. The
exports of the country
have around 70% import
content on an average.
This tends to neutralize
much of the competitive
edge Malaysia could
expect from devaluation.
Furthermore, the ringgit.
Dollar link is causing
discomfiture as the
greenback continues to
slide against the yen. This
automatically imposes an
equivalent depreciation on
the ringgit vis-à-vis the
currency of Japan from
where crucial imports come. Figure 7 above traces the course of the dollar’s fall against
the yen since the ringgit was pegged to the former. The average fall over the period has
been no less than 15%. It is true that if the dollar is losing against the yen, it tends to
appreciate against other major currencies, and to that extent Malaysia also gains. It may,
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Table 3 Ringgit Versus Regional currencies (Rates in Ringgits)
September
2, 1998
September
2, 2000
% Change
100 Korean Won 0.2827 0.3406 -17.0
100 Thai Bath 9.3713 9.0767 3.2
100 Indo. Rupiah 0.0354 0.0442 -19.9
100 Philippine
Pesos
8.8302 8.2981 6.4
Trade weighted
(1990 = 100)
73.10 67.35 -7.9
Source: Malaysian Institute of Economic Research Report
(quoted from Ariff)
however, be noted in the Malaysian context that the yen-$ rate and the greenback’s
value in terms of the Singapore dollar are of greater importance as these three countries
put together constitute about half of the foreign trade of the country, and the proportion of
their combined contribution to investment is presumably even higher. With the recent rise
in oil prices and the reversal in the middle-east peace process the dollar again tends to
rise against the yen in recent weeks. The ringgit- dollar link does not ensure that the
ringgit will not lurch; it only ensures that it must lurch with the dollar.
In view of the long-term volatility of the exchange rate despite the linkage (see table
3), the issue of the peg assumes added importance, and has to be kept under review. By
the end of the year, with a further improvement in the economic performance of the
country an upward revision of the rate to around 3.50 ringgit a dollar may not be much off
the mark. Preferably, the rate may be fixed with reference to a trade weighted basket of
currencies important to Malaysia with the year 2000 as the base.21 The dollar peg may
not remain beneficial for long.
As minor points one can mention the
attainment of self-reliance in agriculture,
especially in food production,
diversification of the industries with more
local consumer products, linking human
resource development to the changing
demands of the economy, more
transparency in public dealings, and
greater effort to alleviate poverty and
increase peoples’ participation in societal
decision-making.
6.  Concluding Remarks 
It comes about that the primary cause of financial crisis in Malaysia was not the weak
macro fundamentals of the economy, but the massive flight of short-term foreign capital
from the country.  Going to the IMF for assistance in such situations has been a common
practice in recent decades. However, it also is a common experience of the assistance
seekers in the developing economies that once with the IMF the difficulties tend to
multiply not only in economic matters but sometimes also on the political front. Often the
preferences and priorities of the recipients in the process of restructuring the economy
clash with those of the IMF. Likewise, there often is a mismatch between repaying
capacity of the country and the payment schedules: at times one needs more assistance
to banish assistance. Malaysia came out of the crisis by herself, retaining her
independence of action, and avoiding in the process many imponderables involved in
going to the IMF. 
The crisis has brought out several weaknesses in the structure of the economy that
have to be remedied. The decision about the exchange peg requires review. The need
for promoting self-reliance to achieve progress can hardly be overemphasized as the
country should neither expect the repetition of massive influx of short-term foreign funds
nor think of relying on them for liquidity any longer.          
NOTES 
1. See World Development Report 1999/2000 Table 11.p. 210
2. (Exports 262714 + Imports 280092) / GDP 281888 at current prices = 1.85 Amounts are in million of
ringgits. Source: Bank Negara Report 1999, Annex Table A-6, p.19
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divider
3. In 1997 gross national savings were 39.4% of the GNP, while net inflow of resources from abroad on
current account was 5.9% of the latter. Foreign capital contributed 13.1% of gross investment for the
year. Source of data Ibid Table A-9 p.21
4. A random sample of individual days’ closing quotations showed greater stability for Tuesday figures
on the criterion of lower variance.
5. On July 1, 1997 the first Tuesday of our study the KLCI was 1031.61 and the RM-$ rate was 2.6410.
These values were respectively 324.17, and 4.2250 a week earlier when controls on capital flows
were imposed. These figures form the basis of our percentages here.
6. For the regression through the origin, the usual formula for calculating the coefficient of
determination r2 is not applicable On the topic see, for example, Aligner pp. 85-90
7. Bank Negara Report 1998 p.55
8. For 1999 the figures for example include the decline in net external liabilities of the commercial
banks due to lower inter-bank borrowings and lower financing requirements for hedging contracts
plus the significant repayment of short-term debt by the non-banking private sector due to rising
interest rates abroad. Some increase in the amount is accounted for by the net liquidation and
repatriation of portfolio investment by foreign investors following the expiry of the 12-month lock-in
period for such investment. See Bank Negara Report 1999 p.55
9. In fact, based on data in A.9 p.243 of Bank Negara Report 1998 the shares of Japan, the US and
Singapore in total trade (imports + exports) of Malaysia in 1997 were respectively 17.2%, 17.7%, and
16.6%; the three between them accounting for more than half the total trade of the country.
10. A good account of the causes of
the crisis and policy response is
provided in the Bank Negara Report
1998 Box 1 pp.11-16
11. Ibid. This distinction was
recognized late during the crisis.
12. Ibid.
13. K.S. Jomo was probably the
speaker for that seminar. Intervening
from the floor the author had then
suggested that imposing capital
controls is the solution, and that the
package should include a three-year
lock-in for foreign capital parked in the
country, the closing down of all private
money changing outlets dotting the
country, the restrictions on remittances
to home by foreign employees making
contributions to the EPF compulsory,
and the demonetizations of 1000, and
500 currency notes. In substance,
though not in details, the measures
announced by the government later
in September were virtually the
same.
14. For details see Bank Negara
Report 1998 Box III PP.61-62
15. See Bank Negara Malaysia
Report 1998 p.87. See Figure 8 for a
reversal of the policy
16. Ibid. p. 89
17. NEAC-MTEN: Facts and
Figures - Inflow and Outflow of
Reserves in USD equivalent
http://vs02. Tvsecure.com/-
vs02Ib5/figures/inflow.shtml Page
1of 2 9/5/00 Effect of the measure
on the KLCI compared to the earlier
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position is depicted in figure 9.
18.    “Flow of FDI to Malaysia up 31 pc Unctad: Overall Southeast Asia received 17 pc less” New Strait
Times October 4, 2000, p.21. However, some do suspect that the controls did quite a lot of damage
to the flow of the FDI into the country. Still, how much of the fall was due to controls, and how much
was due to reassessments of country risk is impossible to quantify without surveying those involved
in the FDI. But for that one needs another paper.
19. It may well be mentioned that even when these tests are not satisfied coefficients remain linear and
unbiased, only they are not efficient. This need not detract much from their explanatory value
20. “Moody’s upgrades Malaysia’s foreign currency ratings” New Strait Times October 18, 2000, p.23
21. The base should be normal year. 1990 fulfills the requirement, but it is already too far back in the
past for fruitful comparisons in years ahead. Presumably year 2000 would be a better choice: it is
normal and leaves the crisis behind.
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